Ethnic diversity has been a fact of life in Russia for centuries. Since the Russian state began expanding eastward, it governs a much larger non-Russian and non-Orthodox population. By the twentieth century, different Turkic groups, the Tatars, different ethnic groups in the Caucasus, and Polish Catholics, among others, found themselves under a state whose essence was the Slavic Eastern Orthodoxy “Great Russians”. It can be argued that historically, being a contiguous land empire, it allowed Russia to hold and integrate its non-Russian lands more closely than the outside colonial empires of the powers of Western Europe. It can also be said that imperial Russia had a better relationship between the core of the ethnic Russian majority and the minority fringes compared to the aforementioned empires of Western Europe.
Fast forward to the modern era, we see a country gradually transforming into less and less “ethnic” Russian. The low rate of ethnic majority gave birth to pioneering forces in Western Europe in the form of various ideological and populist elements that can be collectively categorized under ‘Identity’ Umbrella. To be exact, these are also found in Russia but are much less powerful. The regime under Vladimir Putin is not being threatened by them in the way that the French regime of Emmanuel Macron is being threatened in France by similar powers.
There is also no shortage of powerful or famous people of mixed or minority descent, from ethnically Tatars missing Russia to Shoigu and Lavrov. The propaganda apparatus of the Putin era succeeded in separating the concept of “ethnic purity” from Russian nationalism and allowed the development of an otherwise strong civic nationalism that pacified the Russian ethnic majority from revolting in the ways we see in the West. To be precise, it would be wrong to simply say that this is something new for Russia. Russian nationalist theorists long before that Surcouf They saw their country as a “mixed-race Eurasian” entity. Neither European nor Asian. Lev Gumilyov and Konstantin Leontiev are in this category. And even the ideology so often cited in West Alexander Dugin could easily be said to be of this fold rather than in the fold of Western identity.
Western European Identity At present, pan-European ethnic nationalism is a rather complex mixture. It has multiple sources of origin, multiple currents today, and a large number of ideologists and organizations that sometimes even conflict with one another. Nevertheless, we can trace a common link that can relate to the various post-war European pan-European organizations and ideologies who fall under the umbrella of the term “New Eight”. There was Oswald Mosley and his movement, and there was Alain de Benoist and GRECE among the other “moderates”. There were Islamophobes like Guillaume Fey and anti-Semites like Frances Parker Yuki. There was even the bizarre and influential Nazi Maoist theorist Jean Thiriart who worked in Egypt under the Nasser regime and envisioned a united Europe with a centralism more ambitious than anything the European Union Foundation currently hopes.
Although these forces were once more divided and marginal as well, they are now gaining momentum and threatening the stability of Western societies and the regimes that govern these societies. And the main reason for their rise is without a doubt The novel “The Great Replacement”Deeper in it lies the apparent failure of West Eurasia and North America to accommodate ethnic minorities and amenities, including new immigrants, while preserving community stability. One can blame many things, although I may point the finger at the American junction and its influence across the Atlantic, which is what the European elite looks like now. agree More than ever with.
Talk about demographics and immigration. Let’s use the example of France because it was an example of how demographic shifts are changing the geopolitical destiny of countries. In the Middle Ages and early modern times, what was formerly known as Western France and later the Kingdom of France was the demographic power of Europe. This demographic force was decisive in the eventual ebb and flow of the Christian-Muslim conflict in favor of the former, as evidenced by the crusaders ’storming of the Middle East and centuries later, this demographic may also facilitate French success in the Thirty Years’ War as well as the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. After Napoleon, France entered a prolonged period of demographic stagnation and thus geopolitical deterioration vis-à-vis Britain and Germany. The rapid rise of Germany in the late nineteenth century over France can be attributed in large part to the French demographic recession.
Successive French regimes attempted to solve this problem either by using colonial subjects or by emigration. But the colonies are now gone and the historical sources of immigration to France, Latin Catholic Europe and Poland are themselves in a demographic recession. The French regime is now trying to prevent demographic decline by receiving immigrants from countries that used to be colonies, but it seems that they have failed to absorb and use them to the same extent as Russia.
The questions that I have now, why? Is the impact of the American intersection responsible for destroying the ability of Western European countries to absorb and benefit from ethnic minorities without creating ethnic national forces with a serious suicidal character? Is it because the more authoritarian nature of the Russian regime allows it to better suppress such forces? both of them? another thing?